merge opensource jb u5

Change-Id: I1aaec157aa196f3448eff8636134fce89a814cf2

1 files changed, 1003 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth_tizen/smp.c b/net/bluetooth_tizen/smp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deb1198
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/bluetooth_tizen/smp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1003 @@
+/*
+   BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+   Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+   published by the Free Software Foundation;
+
+   THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+   FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
+   IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+   CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
+   WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+   ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+   OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+   ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
+   COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
+   SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
+*/
+
+#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
+
+#define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
+
+static inline void swap128(u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		dst[15 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+static inline void swap56(u8 src[7], u8 dst[7])
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
+		dst[6 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	int err, iv_len;
+	unsigned char iv[128];
+
+	if (tfm == NULL) {
+		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc.tfm = tfm;
+	desc.flags = 0;
+
+	err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, k, 16);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(&sg, r, 16);
+
+	iv_len = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+	if (iv_len) {
+		memset(&iv, 0xff, iv_len);
+		crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, iv, iv_len);
+	}
+
+	err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
+		u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia,
+		u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+{
+	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
+	int err;
+
+	memset(p1, 0, 16);
+
+	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
+	swap56(pres, p1);
+	swap56(preq, p1 + 7);
+	p1[14] = _rat;
+	p1[15] = _iat;
+
+	memset(p2, 0, 16);
+
+	/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
+	baswap((bdaddr_t *) (p2 + 4), ia);
+	baswap((bdaddr_t *) (p2 + 10), ra);
+
+	/* res = r XOR p1 */
+	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
+
+	/* res = e(k, res) */
+	err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* res = res XOR p2 */
+	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
+
+	/* res = e(k, res) */
+	err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16],
+			u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
+	memcpy(_r, r1 + 8, 8);
+	memcpy(_r + 8, r2 + 8, 8);
+
+	err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_rand(u8 *buf)
+{
+	get_random_bytes(buf, 16);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
+						u16 dlen, void *data)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct l2cap_hdr *lh;
+	int len;
+
+	len = L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(code) + dlen;
+
+	if (len > conn->mtu)
+		return NULL;
+
+	skb = bt_skb_alloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!skb)
+		return NULL;
+
+	lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
+	lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen);
+	lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+
+	memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code));
+
+	memcpy(skb_put(skb, dlen), data, dlen);
+
+	return skb;
+}
+
+static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = smp_build_cmd(conn, code, len, data);
+
+	BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+	if (!skb)
+		return;
+
+	skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
+	hci_send_acl(conn->hchan, skb, 0);
+
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
+}
+
+static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
+{
+	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
+		return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+	else
+		return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+}
+
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
+{
+	switch (sec_level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+		return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
+		return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	default:
+		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
+static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+				struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+				struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp,
+				__u8 authreq)
+{
+	u8 dist_keys = 0;
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		dist_keys = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	} else {
+		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	}
+
+	if (rsp == NULL) {
+		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+		req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+		req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+		req->init_key_dist = 0;
+		req->resp_key_dist = dist_keys;
+		req->auth_req = authreq;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+	rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+	rsp->init_key_dist = 0;
+	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & dist_keys;
+	rsp->auth_req = authreq;
+}
+
+static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+	if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) ||
+			(max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason, u8 send)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+	if (send)
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+								&reason);
+
+	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
+	mgmt_auth_failed(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->type,
+			 hcon->dst_type, reason);
+
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags)) {
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+	}
+}
+
+#define JUST_WORKS	0x00
+#define JUST_CFM	0x01
+#define REQ_PASSKEY	0x02
+#define CFM_PASSKEY	0x03
+#define REQ_OOB		0x04
+#define OVERLAP		0xFF
+
+static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM    },
+	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP     },
+};
+
+static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
+						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	u8 method;
+	u32 passkey = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
+	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
+
+	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
+	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
+	/* Otherwise, look up method from the table */
+	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
+			local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
+			remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+	else
+		method = gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
+
+	/* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */
+	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM)
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
+	if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
+	if (method != JUST_CFM)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
+	 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
+	 */
+	if (method == OVERLAP) {
+		if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+		else
+			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+	}
+
+	/* Generate random passkey. Not valid until confirmed. */
+	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+		u8 key[16];
+
+		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
+		passkey %= 1000000;
+		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key);
+		swap128(key, smp->tk);
+		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
+	}
+
+	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
+
+	if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
+	else
+		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
+						cpu_to_le32(passkey), 0);
+
+	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, confirm);
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+	int ret;
+	u8 res[16], reason;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	smp->tfm = tfm;
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out)
+		ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 0,
+			     conn->src, conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, res);
+	else
+		ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+			     conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src,
+			     res);
+	if (ret) {
+		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+	return;
+
+error:
+	smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
+}
+
+static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, random);
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = smp->tfm;
+	u8 reason, confirm[16], res[16], key[16];
+	int ret;
+
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tfm)) {
+		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+	if (hcon->out)
+		ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 0,
+			     conn->src, hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, res);
+	else
+		ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+			     hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src, res);
+	if (ret) {
+		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	swap128(res, confirm);
+
+	if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
+		BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
+		reason = SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		u8 stk[16], rand[8];
+		__le16 ediv;
+
+		memset(rand, 0, sizeof(rand));
+		ediv = 0;
+
+		smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, key);
+		swap128(key, stk);
+
+		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+		       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+		if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) {
+			reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk);
+		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+	} else {
+		u8 stk[16], r[16], rand[8];
+		__le16 ediv;
+
+		memset(rand, 0, sizeof(rand));
+		ediv = 0;
+
+		swap128(smp->prnd, r);
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(r), r);
+
+		smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, key);
+		swap128(key, stk);
+
+		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+				SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+		hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			    HCI_SMP_STK_SLAVE, 0, 0, stk, smp->enc_key_size,
+			    ediv, rand);
+	}
+
+	return;
+
+error:
+	smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
+}
+
+static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smp_chan), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!smp)
+		return NULL;
+
+	INIT_WORK(&smp->confirm, confirm_work);
+	INIT_WORK(&smp->random, random_work);
+
+	smp->conn = conn;
+	conn->smp_chan = smp;
+	conn->hcon->smp_conn = conn;
+
+	hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
+
+	return smp;
+}
+
+void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+	BUG_ON(!smp);
+
+	if (smp->tfm)
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm);
+
+	kfree(smp);
+	conn->smp_chan = NULL;
+	conn->hcon->smp_conn = NULL;
+	hci_conn_put(conn->hcon);
+}
+
+int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->smp_conn;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	u32 value;
+	u8 key[16];
+
+	BT_DBG("");
+
+	if (!conn)
+		return -ENOTCONN;
+
+	smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+	switch (mgmt_op) {
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+		value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
+		put_unaligned_le32(value, key);
+		swap128(key, smp->tk);
+		/* Fall Through */
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		break;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED, 1);
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED, 1);
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	/* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags))
+		queue_work(hcon->hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	u8 key_size;
+	u8 auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	int ret;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+
+	smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
+
+	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+	if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)
+		auth = req->auth_req;
+
+	conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
+
+	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+	/* Request setup of TK */
+	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	int ret;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
+	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) &&
+			(rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+		auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+
+	auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		u8 random[16];
+
+		swap128(smp->prnd, random);
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
+								random);
+	} else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) {
+		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+	} else {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	swap128(skb->data, smp->rrnd);
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
+
+	queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->random);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct smp_ltk *key;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+	key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type);
+	if (!key)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+		return 1;
+
+	hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val);
+	hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
+
+	return 1;
+
+}
+static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
+
+	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);
+
+	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	__u8 authreq;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
+
+	if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon->hdev))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+		if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
+			goto done;
+
+	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp)
+		return 1;
+
+	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
+
+	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
+		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+
+		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
+		smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	} else {
+		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
+		cp.auth_req = authreq;
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	}
+
+done:
+	hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 authenticated;
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+	authenticated = (conn->hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
+	hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+		    HCI_SMP_LTK, 1, authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+		    rp->ediv, rp->rand);
+	smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1);
+	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	__u8 code = skb->data[0];
+	__u8 reason;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!lmp_host_le_capable(conn->hcon->hdev)) {
+		err = -ENOTSUPP;
+		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
+
+	switch (code) {
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
+		smp_failure(conn, skb->data[0], 0);
+		reason = 0;
+		err = -EPERM;
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
+		reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
+		reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
+		reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
+	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
+	case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
+		/* Just ignored */
+		reason = 0;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+done:
+	if (reason)
+		smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
+
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+	return err;
+}
+
+int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	__u8 *keydist;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force);
+
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+	/* The responder sends its keys first */
+	if (!force && conn->hcon->out && (rsp->resp_key_dist & 0x07))
+		return 0;
+
+	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+		*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+	} else {
+		keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+	}
+
+
+	BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+		struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+		struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+		u8 authenticated;
+		__le16 ediv;
+
+		get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
+		get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+		get_random_bytes(ident.rand, sizeof(ident.rand));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+		hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			    HCI_SMP_LTK_SLAVE, 1, authenticated,
+			    enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, ident.rand);
+
+		ident.ediv = cpu_to_le16(ediv);
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+		struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+		struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+		/* Send a dummy key */
+		get_random_bytes(idinfo.irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+		/* Just public address */
+		memset(&addrinfo, 0, sizeof(addrinfo));
+		bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, conn->src);
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+								&addrinfo);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+		struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+
+		/* Send a dummy key */
+		get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out || force) {
+		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}