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* merge opensource jb u5codeworkx2012-09-221-2/+38
| | | | Change-Id: I1aaec157aa196f3448eff8636134fce89a814cf2
* fix permission issue which prevents "active tasks" shown inGokhan Moral2012-09-181-1/+2
| | | | Change-Id: I16a37870d70e4abd0742e570b470e983d714a4eb
* Merge linux-3.0.31 from korg into jellybeancodeworkx2012-09-181-61/+47
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S drivers/base/core.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_lvds.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/evergreen.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r100.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/rs600.c drivers/usb/core/hub.c drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c drivers/usb/host/xhci.c drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c fs/proc/base.c Change-Id: Ia98b35db3f8c0bfd95817867d3acb85be8e5e772
| * proc: make sure mem_open() doesn't pin the target's memoryOleg Nesterov2012-02-131-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6d08f2c7139790c268820a2e590795cb8333181a upstream. Once /proc/pid/mem is opened, the memory can't be released until mem_release() even if its owner exits. Change mem_open() to do atomic_inc(mm_count) + mmput(), this only pins mm_struct. Change mem_rw() to do atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_count) before access_remote_vm(), this verifies that this mm is still alive. I am not sure what should mem_rw() return if atomic_inc_not_zero() fails. With this patch it returns zero to match the "mm == NULL" case, may be it should return -EINVAL like it did before e268337d. Perhaps it makes sense to add the additional fatal_signal_pending() check into the main loop, to ensure we do not hold this memory if the target task was oom-killed. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * proc: unify mem_read() and mem_write()Oleg Nesterov2012-02-131-58/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 572d34b946bae070debd42db1143034d9687e13f upstream. No functional changes, cleanup and preparation. mem_read() and mem_write() are very similar. Move this code into the new common helper, mem_rw(), which takes the additional "int write" argument. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * proc: mem_release() should check mm != NULLOleg Nesterov2012-02-131-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 71879d3cb3dd8f2dfdefb252775c1b3ea04a3dd4 upstream. mem_release() can hit mm == NULL, add the necessary check. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem handlingLinus Torvalds2012-01-251-106/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e268337dfe26dfc7efd422a804dbb27977a3cccc upstream. Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the other related files. This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open. That simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_ VM. That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler. If somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert this commit. I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping addresses will also have changed as part of the execve. So you cannot actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all the offsets for IO would have changed too. Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <asd@ut.ee> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* | samsung update 1codeworkx2012-06-021-107/+80
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* vfs: show O_CLOEXE bit properly in /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> filesLinus Torvalds2011-11-111-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1117f72ea0217ba0cc19f05adbbd8b9a397f5ab7 upstream. The CLOEXE bit is magical, and for performance (and semantic) reasons we don't actually maintain it in the file descriptor itself, but in a separate bit array. Which means that when we show f_flags, the CLOEXE status is shown incorrectly: we show the status not as it is now, but as it was when the file was opened. Fix that by looking up the bit properly in the 'fdt->close_on_exec' bit array. Uli needs this in order to re-implement the pfiles program: "For normal file descriptors (not sockets) this was the last piece of information which wasn't available. This is all part of my 'give Solaris users no reason to not switch' effort. I intend to offer the code to the util-linux-ng maintainers." Requested-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@akkadia.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* proc: fix a race in do_io_accounting()Vasiliy Kulikov2011-08-041-3/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 293eb1e7772b25a93647c798c7b89bf26c2da2e0 upstream. If an inode's mode permits opening /proc/PID/io and the resulting file descriptor is kept across execve() of a setuid or similar binary, the ptrace_may_access() check tries to prevent using this fd against the task with escalated privileges. Unfortunately, there is a race in the check against execve(). If execve() is processed after the ptrace check, but before the actual io information gathering, io statistics will be gathered from the privileged process. At least in theory this might lead to gathering sensible information (like ssh/ftp password length) that wouldn't be available otherwise. Holding task->signal->cred_guard_mutex while gathering the io information should protect against the race. The order of locking is similar to the one inside of ptrace_attach(): first goes cred_guard_mutex, then lock_task_sighand(). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/ioVasiliy Kulikov2011-06-281-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | /proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace the target process. ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of "io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the setuid'ed process. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc_fd_permission() is doesn't need to bail out in RCU modeAl Viro2011-06-201-5/+1
| | | | | | nothing blocking except generic_permission() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmetcalf/linux-tileLinus Torvalds2011-05-291-0/+9
|\ | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmetcalf/linux-tile: arch/tile: more /proc and /sys file support
| * arch/tile: more /proc and /sys file supportChris Metcalf2011-05-271-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change introduces a few of the less controversial /proc and /proc/sys interfaces for tile, along with sysfs attributes for various things that were originally proposed as /proc/tile files. It also adjusts the "hardwall" proc API. Arnd Bergmann reviewed the initial arch/tile submission, which included a complete set of all the /proc/tile and /proc/sys/tile knobs that we had added in a somewhat ad hoc way during initial development, and provided feedback on where most of them should go. One knob turned out to be similar enough to the existing /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace that it was re-implemented to use that model instead. Another knob was /proc/tile/grid, which reported the "grid" dimensions of a tile chip (e.g. 8x8 processors = 64-core chip). Arnd suggested looking at sysfs for that, so this change moves that information to a pair of sysfs attributes (chip_width and chip_height) in the /sys/devices/system/cpu directory. We also put the "chip_serial" and "chip_revision" information from our old /proc/tile/board file as attributes in /sys/devices/system/cpu. Other information collected via hypervisor APIs is now placed in /sys/hypervisor. We create a /sys/hypervisor/type file (holding the constant string "tilera") to be parallel with the Xen use of /sys/hypervisor/type holding "xen". We create three top-level files, "version" (the hypervisor's own version), "config_version" (the version of the configuration file), and "hvconfig" (the contents of the configuration file). The remaining information from our old /proc/tile/board and /proc/tile/switch files becomes an attribute group appearing under /sys/hypervisor/board/. Finally, after some feedback from Arnd Bergmann for the previous version of this patch, the /proc/tile/hardwall file is split up into two conceptual parts. First, a directory /proc/tile/hardwall/ which contains one file per active hardwall, each file named after the hardwall's ID and holding a cpulist that says which cpus are enclosed by the hardwall. Second, a /proc/PID file "hardwall" that is either empty (for non-hardwall-using processes) or contains the hardwall ID. Finally, this change pushes the /proc/sys/tile/unaligned_fixup/ directory, with knobs controlling the kernel code for handling the fixup of unaligned exceptions. Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
* | proc: put check_mem_permission after __get_free_page in mem_writeKOSAKI Motohiro2011-05-261-7/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It whould be better if put check_mem_permission after __get_free_page in mem_write, to be same as function mem_read. Hugh Dickins explained the reason. check_mem_permission gets a reference to the mm. If we __get_free_page after check_mem_permission, imagine what happens if the system is out of memory, and the mm we're looking at is selected for killing by the OOM killer: while we wait in __get_free_page for more memory, no memory is freed from the selected mm because it cannot reach exit_mmap while we hold that reference. Reported-by: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | fs/proc: convert to kstrtoX()Alexey Dobriyan2011-05-261-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert fs/proc/ from strict_strto*() to kstrto*() functions. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | mm: extract exe_file handling from procfsJiri Slaby2011-05-261-51/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Setup and cleanup of mm_struct->exe_file is currently done in fs/proc/. This was because exe_file was needed only for /proc/<pid>/exe. Since we will need the exe_file functionality also for core dumps (so core name can contain full binary path), built this functionality always into the kernel. To achieve that move that out of proc FS to the kernel/ where in fact it should belong. By doing that we can make dup_mm_exe_file static. Also we can drop linux/proc_fs.h inclusion in fs/exec.c and kernel/fork.c. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | ns: proc files for namespace naming policy.Eric W. Biederman2011-05-101-11/+9
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ to allow controlling the namespaces of a process. This addresses three specific problems that can make namespaces hard to work with. - Namespaces require a dedicated process to pin them in memory. - It is not possible to use a namespace unless you are the child of the original creator. - Namespaces don't have names that userspace can use to talk about them. The namespace files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ can be opened and the file descriptor can be used to talk about a specific namespace, and to keep the specified namespace alive. A namespace can be kept alive by either holding the file descriptor open or bind mounting the file someplace else. aka: mount --bind /proc/self/ns/net /some/filesystem/path mount --bind /proc/self/fd/<N> /some/filesystem/path This allows namespaces to be named with userspace policy. It requires additional support to make use of these filedescriptors and that will be comming in the following patches. Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* proc: do proper range check on readdir offsetLinus Torvalds2011-04-181-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | Rather than pass in some random truncated offset to the pid-related functions, check that the offset is in range up-front. This is just cleanup, the previous commit fixed the real problem. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Fix common misspellingsLucas De Marchi2011-03-311-1/+1
| | | | | | Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed. Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-03-231-63/+118
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: deal with races in /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} proc: enable writing to /proc/pid/mem proc: make check_mem_permission() return an mm_struct on success proc: hold cred_guard_mutex in check_mem_permission() proc: disable mem_write after exec mm: implement access_remote_vm mm: factor out main logic of access_process_vm mm: use mm_struct to resolve gate vma's in __get_user_pages mm: arch: rename in_gate_area_no_task to in_gate_area_no_mm mm: arch: make in_gate_area take an mm_struct instead of a task_struct mm: arch: make get_gate_vma take an mm_struct instead of a task_struct x86: mark associated mm when running a task in 32 bit compatibility mode x86: add context tag to mark mm when running a task in 32-bit compatibility mode auxv: require the target to be tracable (or yourself) close race in /proc/*/environ report errors in /proc/*/*map* sanely pagemap: close races with suid execve make sessionid permissions in /proc/*/task/* match those in /proc/* fix leaks in path_lookupat() Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/proc/base.c
| * deal with races in /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}Al Viro2011-03-231-19/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All of those are rw-r--r-- and all are broken for suid - if you open a file before the target does suid-root exec, you'll be still able to access it. For personality it's not a big deal, but for syscall and stack it's a real problem. Fix: check that task is tracable for you at the time of read(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * proc: enable writing to /proc/pid/memStephen Wilson2011-03-231-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With recent changes there is no longer a security hazard with writing to /proc/pid/mem. Remove the #ifdef. Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * proc: make check_mem_permission() return an mm_struct on successStephen Wilson2011-03-231-24/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change allows us to take advantage of access_remote_vm(), which in turn eliminates a security issue with the mem_write() implementation. The previous implementation of mem_write() was insecure since the target task could exec a setuid-root binary between the permission check and the actual write. Holding a reference to the target mm_struct eliminates this vulnerability. Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * proc: hold cred_guard_mutex in check_mem_permission()Stephen Wilson2011-03-231-4/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Avoid a potential race when task exec's and we get a new ->mm but check against the old credentials in ptrace_may_access(). Holding of the mutex is implemented by factoring out the body of the code into a helper function __check_mem_permission(). Performing this factorization now simplifies upcoming changes and minimizes churn in the diff's. Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * proc: disable mem_write after execStephen Wilson2011-03-231-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change makes mem_write() observe the same constraints as mem_read(). This is particularly important for mem_write as an accidental leak of the fd across an exec could result in arbitrary modification of the target process' memory. IOW, /proc/pid/mem is implicitly close-on-exec. Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * auxv: require the target to be tracable (or yourself)Al Viro2011-03-231-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | same as for environ, except that we didn't do any checks to prevent access after suid execve Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * close race in /proc/*/environAl Viro2011-03-231-6/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Switch to mm_for_maps(). Maybe we ought to make it r--r--r--, since we do checks on IO anyway... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * report errors in /proc/*/*map* sanelyAl Viro2011-03-231-3/+5
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * pagemap: close races with suid execveAl Viro2011-03-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | just use mm_for_maps() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * make sessionid permissions in /proc/*/task/* match those in /proc/*Al Viro2011-03-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | procfs: fix some wrong error code usageJovi Zhang2011-03-231-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [root@wei 1]# cat /proc/1/mem cat: /proc/1/mem: No such process error code -ESRCH is wrong in this situation. Return -EPERM instead. Signed-off-by: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | proc: hide kernel addresses via %pK in /proc/<pid>/stackKonstantin Khlebnikov2011-03-231-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | This file is readable for the task owner. Hide kernel addresses from unprivileged users, leave them function names and offsets. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* /proc/self is never going to be invalidated...Al Viro2011-03-101-30/+0
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* oom: allow a non-CAP_SYS_RESOURCE proces to oom_score_adj downMandeep Singh Baines2011-01-131-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We'd like to be able to oom_score_adj a process up/down as it enters/leaves the foreground. Currently, it is not possible to oom_adj down without CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. This patch allows a task to decrease its oom_score_adj back to the value that a CAP_SYS_RESOURCE thread set it to or its inherited value at fork. Assuming the thread that has forked it has oom_score_adj of 0, each process could decrease it back from 0 upon activation unless a CAP_SYS_RESOURCE thread elevated it to something higher. Alternative considered: * a setuid binary * a daemon with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Since you don't wan't all processes to be able to reduce their oom_adj, a setuid or daemon implementation would be complex. The alternatives also have much higher overhead. This patch updated from original patch based on feedback from David Rientjes. Signed-off-by: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc: use single_open() correctlyJovi Zhang2011-01-131-26/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | single_open()'s third argument is for copying into seq_file->private. Use that, rather than open-coding it. Signed-off-by: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc: use seq_puts()/seq_putc() where possibleAlexey Dobriyan2011-01-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For string without format specifiers, use seq_puts(). For seq_printf("\n"), use seq_putc('\n'). text data bss dec hex filename 61866 488 112 62466 f402 fs/proc/proc.o 61729 488 112 62329 f379 fs/proc/proc.o ---------------------------------------------------- -139 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs/proc/base.c, kernel/latencytop.c: convert sprintf_symbol() to %psJoe Perches2011-01-131-14/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | Use temporary lr for struct latency_record for improved readability and fewer columns used. Removed trailing space from output. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'vfs-scale-working' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-01-071-16/+37
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin * 'vfs-scale-working' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin: (57 commits) fs: scale mntget/mntput fs: rename vfsmount counter helpers fs: implement faster dentry memcmp fs: prefetch inode data in dcache lookup fs: improve scalability of pseudo filesystems fs: dcache per-inode inode alias locking fs: dcache per-bucket dcache hash locking bit_spinlock: add required includes kernel: add bl_list xfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation btrfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation ext2,3,4: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation fs: provide simple rcu-walk generic_check_acl implementation fs: provide rcu-walk aware permission i_ops fs: rcu-walk aware d_revalidate method fs: cache optimise dentry and inode for rcu-walk fs: dcache reduce branches in lookup path fs: dcache remove d_mounted fs: fs_struct use seqlock fs: rcu-walk for path lookup ...
| * fs: provide rcu-walk aware permission i_opsNick Piggin2011-01-071-2/+4
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
| * fs: rcu-walk aware d_revalidate methodNick Piggin2011-01-071-7/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Require filesystems be aware of .d_revalidate being called in rcu-walk mode (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU). For now do a simple push down, returning -ECHILD from all implementations. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
| * fs: dcache reduce branches in lookup pathNick Piggin2011-01-071-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reduce some branches and memory accesses in dcache lookup by adding dentry flags to indicate common d_ops are set, rather than having to check them. This saves a pointer memory access (dentry->d_op) in common path lookup situations, and saves another pointer load and branch in cases where we have d_op but not the particular operation. Patched with: git grep -E '[.>]([[:space:]])*d_op([[:space:]])*=' | xargs sed -e 's/\([^\t ]*\)->d_op = \(.*\);/d_set_d_op(\1, \2);/' -e 's/\([^\t ]*\)\.d_op = \(.*\);/d_set_d_op(\&\1, \2);/' -i Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
| * fs: change d_delete semanticsNick Piggin2011-01-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change d_delete from a dentry deletion notification to a dentry caching advise, more like ->drop_inode. Require it to be constant and idempotent, and not take d_lock. This is how all existing filesystems use the callback anyway. This makes fine grained dentry locking of dput and dentry lru scanning much simpler. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
* | Merge branch 'linus' into sched/coreIngo Molnar2010-12-081-1/+1
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | Merge reason: we want to queue up dependent cleanup Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
| * Revert "vfs: show unreachable paths in getcwd and proc"Eric W. Biederman2010-12-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because it caused a chroot ttyname regression in 2.6.36. As of 2.6.36 ttyname does not work in a chroot. It has already been reported that screen breaks, and for me this breaks an automated distribution testsuite, that I need to preserve the ability to run the existing binaries on for several more years. glibc 2.11.3 which has a fix for this is not an option. The root cause of this breakage is: commit 8df9d1a4142311c084ffeeacb67cd34d190eff74 Author: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Date: Tue Aug 10 11:41:41 2010 +0200 vfs: show unreachable paths in getcwd and proc Prepend "(unreachable)" to path strings if the path is not reachable from the current root. Two places updated are - the return string from getcwd() - and symlinks under /proc/$PID. Other uses of d_path() are left unchanged (we know that some old software crashes if /proc/mounts is changed). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> So remove the nice sounding, but ultimately ill advised change to how /proc/fd symlinks work. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | sched: Add 'autogroup' scheduling feature: automated per session task groupsMike Galbraith2010-11-301-0/+79
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A recurring complaint from CFS users is that parallel kbuild has a negative impact on desktop interactivity. This patch implements an idea from Linus, to automatically create task groups. Currently, only per session autogroups are implemented, but the patch leaves the way open for enhancement. Implementation: each task's signal struct contains an inherited pointer to a refcounted autogroup struct containing a task group pointer, the default for all tasks pointing to the init_task_group. When a task calls setsid(), a new task group is created, the process is moved into the new task group, and a reference to the preveious task group is dropped. Child processes inherit this task group thereafter, and increase it's refcount. When the last thread of a process exits, the process's reference is dropped, such that when the last process referencing an autogroup exits, the autogroup is destroyed. At runqueue selection time, IFF a task has no cgroup assignment, its current autogroup is used. Autogroup bandwidth is controllable via setting it's nice level through the proc filesystem: cat /proc/<pid>/autogroup Displays the task's group and the group's nice level. echo <nice level> > /proc/<pid>/autogroup Sets the task group's shares to the weight of nice <level> task. Setting nice level is rate limited for !admin users due to the abuse risk of task group locking. The feature is enabled from boot by default if CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP=y is selected, but can be disabled via the boot option noautogroup, and can also be turned on/off on the fly via: echo [01] > /proc/sys/kernel/sched_autogroup_enabled ... which will automatically move tasks to/from the root task group. Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> [ Removed the task_group_path() debug code, and fixed !EVENTFD build failure. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> LKML-Reference: <1290281700.28711.9.camel@maggy.simson.net> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* signals: move cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_structKOSAKI Motohiro2010-10-271-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Oleg Nesterov pointed out we have to prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec itself and we can reuse ->cred_guard_mutex for it. Yes, concurrent execve() has no worth. Let's move ->cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct. It naturally prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec. Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-10-261-0/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (52 commits) split invalidate_inodes() fs: skip I_FREEING inodes in writeback_sb_inodes fs: fold invalidate_list into invalidate_inodes fs: do not drop inode_lock in dispose_list fs: inode split IO and LRU lists fs: switch bdev inode bdi's correctly fs: fix buffer invalidation in invalidate_list fsnotify: use dget_parent smbfs: use dget_parent exportfs: use dget_parent fs: use RCU read side protection in d_validate fs: clean up dentry lru modification fs: split __shrink_dcache_sb fs: improve DCACHE_REFERENCED usage fs: use percpu counter for nr_dentry and nr_dentry_unused fs: simplify __d_free fs: take dcache_lock inside __d_path fs: do not assign default i_ino in new_inode fs: introduce a per-cpu last_ino allocator new helper: ihold() ...
| * fs: do not assign default i_ino in new_inodeChristoph Hellwig2010-10-251-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of always assigning an increasing inode number in new_inode move the call to assign it into those callers that actually need it. For now callers that need it is estimated conservatively, that is the call is added to all filesystems that do not assign an i_ino by themselves. For a few more filesystems we can avoid assigning any inode number given that they aren't user visible, and for others it could be done lazily when an inode number is actually needed, but that's left for later patches. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * vfs: introduce FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET for allowing negative f_posKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki2010-10-251-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now, rw_verify_area() checsk f_pos is negative or not. And if negative, returns -EINVAL. But, some special files as /dev/(k)mem and /proc/<pid>/mem etc.. has negative offsets. And we can't do any access via read/write to the file(device). So introduce FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET to allow negative file offsets. Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2024-05-14 09:27:33 +0000