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* Merge remote-tracking branch 'kernelorg/linux-3.0.y' into 3_0_64Andrew Dodd2013-02-272-1/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/arm/Kconfig arch/arm/include/asm/hwcap.h arch/arm/kernel/smp.c arch/arm/plat-samsung/adc.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_drv.h drivers/mmc/core/sd.c drivers/net/tun.c drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c drivers/regulator/max8997.c drivers/usb/core/hub.c drivers/usb/host/xhci.h drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c fs/jbd2/transaction.c include/linux/migrate.h kernel/sys.c kernel/time/timekeeping.c lib/genalloc.c mm/memory-failure.c mm/memory_hotplug.c mm/mempolicy.c mm/page_alloc.c mm/vmalloc.c mm/vmscan.c mm/vmstat.c scripts/Kbuild.include Change-Id: I91e2d85c07320c7ccfc04cf98a448e89bed6ade6
| * selinux: fix sel_netnode_insert() suspicious rcu dereferenceDave Jones2012-11-261-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 88a693b5c1287be4da937699cb82068ce9db0135 upstream. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Not tainted ------------------------------- security/selinux/netnode.c:178 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by trinity-child1/8750: #0: (sel_netnode_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff812d8f8a>] sel_netnode_sid+0x16a/0x3e0 stack backtrace: Pid: 8750, comm: trinity-child1 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810cec2d>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 [<ffffffff812d91d1>] sel_netnode_sid+0x3b1/0x3e0 [<ffffffff812d8e20>] ? sel_netnode_find+0x1a0/0x1a0 [<ffffffff812d24a6>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf6/0x2c0 [<ffffffff810cd1dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff810cdb55>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.9+0x15/0x1a0 [<ffffffff81093841>] ? lock_hrtimer_base+0x31/0x60 [<ffffffff812c9536>] security_socket_bind+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815550ca>] sys_bind+0x7a/0x100 [<ffffffff816c03d5>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810d392d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8133b09e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff816c03a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b This patch below does what Paul McKenney suggested in the previous thread. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * SELinux: if sel_make_bools errors don't leave inconsistent stateEric Paris2012-06-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 154c50ca4eb9ae472f50b6a481213e21ead4457d upstream. We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the number of entries in these arrays to 0. If we error out and then get back into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief that they are non-zero length. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | merge opensource jb u5codeworkx2012-09-224-578/+1156
| | | | | | | | Change-Id: I1aaec157aa196f3448eff8636134fce89a814cf2
* | Merge linux-3.0.31 from korg into jellybeancodeworkx2012-09-185-26/+43
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S drivers/base/core.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_lvds.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/evergreen.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r100.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/rs600.c drivers/usb/core/hub.c drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c drivers/usb/host/xhci.c drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c fs/proc/base.c Change-Id: Ia98b35db3f8c0bfd95817867d3acb85be8e5e772
| * security: fix compile error in commoncap.cJonghwan Choi2012-04-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 51b79bee627d526199b2f6a6bef8ee0c0739b6d1 upstream. Add missing "personality.h" security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds': security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function) security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.) Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi <jhbird.choi@samsung.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are usedEric Paris2012-04-221-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 upstream. If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared. Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it easier to attack. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.Tetsuo Handa2012-04-131-18/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit df91e49477a9be15921cb2854e1d12a3bdb5e425 upstream. Userspace can pass in arbitrary combinations of MS_* flags to mount(). If both MS_BIND and one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE are passed, device name which should be checked for MS_BIND was not checked because MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE had higher priority than MS_BIND. If both one of MS_BIND/MS_MOVE and MS_REMOUNT are passed, device name which should not be checked for MS_REMOUNT was checked because MS_BIND/MS_MOVE had higher priority than MS_REMOUNT. Fix these bugs by changing priority to MS_REMOUNT -> MS_BIND -> MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE -> MS_MOVE as with do_mount() does. Also, unconditionally return -EINVAL if more than one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE is passed so that TOMOYO will not generate inaccurate audit logs, for commit 7a2e8a8f "VFS: Sanity check mount flags passed to change_mnt_propagation()" clarified that these flags must be exclusively passed. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * ima: fix invalid memory referenceRoberto Sassu2012-01-251-5/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7b7e5916aa2f46e57f8bd8cb89c34620ebfda5da upstream. Don't free a valid measurement entry on TPM PCR extend failure. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
| * ima: free duplicate measurement memoryRoberto Sassu2012-01-252-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 45fae7493970d7c45626ccd96d4a74f5f1eea5a9 upstream. Info about new measurements are cached in the iint for performance. When the inode is flushed from cache, the associated iint is flushed as well. Subsequent access to the inode will cause the inode to be re-measured and will attempt to add a duplicate entry to the measurement list. This patch frees the duplicate measurement memory, fixing a memory leak. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
| * SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()David Howells2012-01-061-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 50345f1ea9cda4618d9c26e590a97ecd4bc7ac75 upstream. Fix the following bug in sel_netport_insert() where rcu_dereference() should be rcu_dereference_protected() as sel_netport_lock is held. =================================================== [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ] --------------------------------------------------- security/selinux/netport.c:127 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by ossec-rootcheck/3323: #0: (sel_netport_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff8117d775>] sel_netport_sid+0xbb/0x226 stack backtrace: Pid: 3323, comm: ossec-rootcheck Not tainted 3.1.0-rc8-fsdevel+ #1095 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8105cfb7>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xa7/0xb0 [<ffffffff8117d871>] sel_netport_sid+0x1b7/0x226 [<ffffffff8117d6ba>] ? sel_netport_avc_callback+0xbc/0xbc [<ffffffff8117556c>] selinux_socket_bind+0x115/0x230 [<ffffffff810a5388>] ? might_fault+0x4e/0x9e [<ffffffff810a53d1>] ? might_fault+0x97/0x9e [<ffffffff81171cf4>] security_socket_bind+0x11/0x13 [<ffffffff812ba967>] sys_bind+0x56/0x95 [<ffffffff81380dac>] ? sysret_check+0x27/0x62 [<ffffffff8105b767>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11e/0x155 [<ffffffff81076fcd>] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x17b/0x1ae [<ffffffff811b5eae>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff81380d7b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* | samsung update 1codeworkx2012-06-028-321/+556
|/
* fix apparmor dereferencing potentially freed dentry, sanitize __d_path() APIAl Viro2011-12-212-30/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 02125a826459a6ad142f8d91c5b6357562f96615 upstream. __d_path() API is asking for trouble and in case of apparmor d_namespace_path() getting just that. The root cause is that when __d_path() misses the root it had been told to look for, it stores the location of the most remote ancestor in *root. Without grabbing references. Sure, at the moment of call it had been pinned down by what we have in *path. And if we raced with umount -l, we could have very well stopped at vfsmount/dentry that got freed as soon as prepend_path() dropped vfsmount_lock. It is safe to compare these pointers with pre-existing (and known to be still alive) vfsmount and dentry, as long as all we are asking is "is it the same address?". Dereferencing is not safe and apparmor ended up stepping into that. d_namespace_path() really wants to examine the place where we stopped, even if it's not connected to our namespace. As the result, it looked at ->d_sb->s_magic of a dentry that might've been already freed by that point. All other callers had been careful enough to avoid that, but it's really a bad interface - it invites that kind of trouble. The fix is fairly straightforward, even though it's bigger than I'd like: * prepend_path() root argument becomes const. * __d_path() is never called with NULL/NULL root. It was a kludge to start with. Instead, we have an explicit function - d_absolute_root(). Same as __d_path(), except that it doesn't get root passed and stops where it stops. apparmor and tomoyo are using it. * __d_path() returns NULL on path outside of root. The main caller is show_mountinfo() and that's precisely what we pass root for - to skip those outside chroot jail. Those who don't want that can (and do) use d_path(). * __d_path() root argument becomes const. Everyone agrees, I hope. * apparmor does *NOT* try to use __d_path() or any of its variants when it sees that path->mnt is an internal vfsmount. In that case it's definitely not mounted anywhere and dentry_path() is exactly what we want there. Handling of sysctl()-triggered weirdness is moved to that place. * if apparmor is asked to do pathname relative to chroot jail and __d_path() tells it we it's not in that jail, the sucker just calls d_absolute_path() instead. That's the other remaining caller of __d_path(), BTW. * seq_path_root() does _NOT_ return -ENAMETOOLONG (it's stupid anyway - the normal seq_file logics will take care of growing the buffer and redoing the call of ->show() just fine). However, if it gets path not reachable from root, it returns SEQ_SKIP. The only caller adjusted (i.e. stopped ignoring the return value as it used to do). Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> ACKed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* KEYS: Fix a NULL pointer deref in the user-defined key typeDavid Howells2011-11-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9f35a33b8d06263a165efe3541d9aa0cdbd70b3b upstream. Fix a NULL pointer deref in the user-defined key type whereby updating a negative key into a fully instantiated key will cause an oops to occur when the code attempts to free the non-existent old payload. This results in an oops that looks something like the following: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 IP: [<ffffffff81085fa1>] __call_rcu+0x11/0x13e PGD 3391d067 PUD 3894a067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP CPU 1 Pid: 4354, comm: keyctl Not tainted 3.1.0-fsdevel+ #1140 /DG965RY RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81085fa1>] [<ffffffff81085fa1>] __call_rcu+0x11/0x13e RSP: 0018:ffff88003d591df8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000006e RDX: ffffffff8161d0c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88003d591e18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8152fa6c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000300 R12: ffff88003b8f9538 R13: ffffffff8161d0c0 R14: ffff88003b8f9d50 R15: ffff88003c69f908 FS: 00007f97eb18c720(0000) GS:ffff88003bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000003d47a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process keyctl (pid: 4354, threadinfo ffff88003d590000, task ffff88003c78a040) Stack: ffff88003e0ffde0 ffff88003b8f9538 0000000000000001 ffff88003b8f9d50 ffff88003d591e28 ffffffff810860f0 ffff88003d591e68 ffffffff8117bfea ffff88003d591e68 ffffffff00000000 ffff88003e0ffde1 ffff88003e0ffde0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810860f0>] call_rcu_sched+0x10/0x12 [<ffffffff8117bfea>] user_update+0x8d/0xa2 [<ffffffff8117723a>] key_create_or_update+0x236/0x270 [<ffffffff811789b1>] sys_add_key+0x123/0x17e [<ffffffff813b84bb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* AppArmor: Fix masking of capabilities in complain modeJohn Johansen2011-08-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 25e75dff519bcce2cb35023105e7df51d7b9e691 upstream. AppArmor is masking the capabilities returned by capget against the capabilities mask in the profile. This is wrong, in complain mode the profile has effectively all capabilities, as the profile restrictions are not being enforced, merely tested against to determine if an access is known by the profile. This can result in the wrong behavior of security conscience applications like sshd which examine their capability set, and change their behavior accordingly. In this case because of the masked capability set being returned sshd fails due to DAC checks, even when the profile is in complain mode. Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* AppArmor: Fix reference to rcu protected pointer outside of rcu_read_lockJohn Johansen2011-08-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 04fdc099f9c80c7775dbac388fc97e156d4d47e7 upstream. The pointer returned from tracehook_tracer_task() is only valid inside the rcu_read_lock. However the tracer pointer obtained is being passed to aa_may_ptrace outside of the rcu_read_lock critical section. Mover the aa_may_ptrace test into the rcu_read_lock critical section, to fix this. Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0 Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* KEYS: Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link()David Howells2011-06-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link(). If construct_alloc_key() returns an error, it shouldn't pass out through the normal path as the key_serial() called by the kleave() statement will oops when it gets an error code in the pointer: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffff84 IP: [<ffffffff8120b401>] request_key_and_link+0x4d7/0x52f .. Call Trace: [<ffffffff8120b52c>] request_key+0x41/0x75 [<ffffffffa00ed6e8>] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x206/0x226 [cifs] [<ffffffffa00eb0c9>] CIFS_SessSetup+0x511/0x1234 [cifs] [<ffffffffa00d9799>] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs] [<ffffffffa00d9c02>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x34b/0x40f [cifs] [<ffffffffa00d9e05>] cifs_mount+0x13f/0x504 [cifs] [<ffffffffa00caabb>] cifs_do_mount+0xc4/0x672 [cifs] [<ffffffff8113ae8c>] mount_fs+0x69/0x155 [<ffffffff8114ff0e>] vfs_kern_mount+0x63/0xa0 [<ffffffff81150be2>] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xdf [<ffffffff81152278>] do_mount+0x63c/0x69f [<ffffffff8115255c>] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2 [<ffffffff814fbdc2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-06-201-7/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: devcgroup_inode_permission: take "is it a device node" checks to inlined wrapper fix comment in generic_permission() kill obsolete comment for follow_down() proc_sys_permission() is OK in RCU mode reiserfs_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode proc_fd_permission() is doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode nilfs2_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode logfs doesn't need ->permission() at all coda_ioctl_permission() is safe in RCU mode cifs_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode bad_inode_permission() is safe from RCU mode ubifs: dereferencing an ERR_PTR in ubifs_mount()
| * devcgroup_inode_permission: take "is it a device node" checks to inlined wrapperAl Viro2011-06-201-7/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | inode_permission() calls devcgroup_inode_permission() and almost all such calls are _not_ for device nodes; let's at least keep the common path straight... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | KEYS/DNS: Fix ____call_usermodehelper() to not lose the session keyringDavid Howells2011-06-171-2/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the subprocess_inf::init() function. The problem is that commit 17f60a7da150 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function. This wipes all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called. The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init(). That means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials _before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the system. This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to /sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to instantiate the key. This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail with ENOKEY unconditionally. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux ↵James Morris2011-06-152-1/+39
|\ | | | | | | into for-linus
| * SELinux: skip file_name_trans_write() when policy downgraded.Roy.Li2011-06-141-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When policy version is less than POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS, skip file_name_trans_write(). Signed-off-by: Roy.Li <rongqing.li@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * selinux: fix case of names with whitespace/multibytes on /selinux/createKohei Kaigai2011-05-261-1/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I submit the patch again, according to patch submission convension. This patch enables to accept percent-encoded object names as forth argument of /selinux/create interface to avoid possible bugs when we give an object name including whitespace or multibutes. E.g) if and when a userspace object manager tries to create a new object named as "resolve.conf but fake", it shall give this name as the forth argument of the /selinux/create. But sscanf() logic in kernel space fetches only the part earlier than the first whitespace. In this case, selinux may unexpectedly answer a default security context configured to "resolve.conf", but it is bug. Although I could not test this patch on named TYPE_TRANSITION rules actually, But debug printk() message seems to me the logic works correctly. I assume the libselinux provides an interface to apply this logic transparently, so nothing shall not be changed from the viewpoint of application. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@emea.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * Merge commit 'v2.6.39' into 20110526Eric Paris2011-05-2616-64/+148
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: lib/flex_array.c security/selinux/avc.c security/selinux/hooks.c security/selinux/ss/policydb.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c
* | | TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl().Tetsuo Handa2011-06-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request. Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | AppArmor: Fix sleep in invalid context from task_setrlimitJohn Johansen2011-06-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Affected kernels 2.6.36 - 3.0 AppArmor may do a GFP_KERNEL memory allocation with task_lock(tsk->group_leader); held when called from security_task_setrlimit. This will only occur when the task's current policy has been replaced, and the task's creds have not been updated before entering the LSM security_task_setrlimit() hook. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:847 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1583, name: cupsd 2 locks held by cupsd/1583: #0: (tasklist_lock){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8104dafa>] do_prlimit+0x61/0x189 #1: (&(&p->alloc_lock)->rlock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8104db2d>] do_prlimit+0x94/0x189 Pid: 1583, comm: cupsd Not tainted 3.0.0-rc2-git1 #7 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8102ebf2>] __might_sleep+0x10d/0x112 [<ffffffff810e6f46>] slab_pre_alloc_hook.isra.49+0x2d/0x33 [<ffffffff810e7bc4>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x22/0x132 [<ffffffff8105b6e6>] prepare_creds+0x35/0xe4 [<ffffffff811c0675>] aa_replace_current_profile+0x35/0xb2 [<ffffffff811c4d2d>] aa_current_profile+0x45/0x4c [<ffffffff811c4d4d>] apparmor_task_setrlimit+0x19/0x3a [<ffffffff811beaa5>] security_task_setrlimit+0x11/0x13 [<ffffffff8104db6b>] do_prlimit+0xd2/0x189 [<ffffffff8104dea9>] sys_setrlimit+0x3b/0x48 [<ffffffff814062bb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reported-by: Miles Lane <miles.lane@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | selinux: simplify and clean up inode_has_perm()Linus Torvalds2011-06-081-10/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a rather hot function that is called with a potentially NULL "struct common_audit_data" pointer argument. And in that case it has to provide and initialize its own dummy common_audit_data structure. However, all the _common_ cases already pass it a real audit-data structure, so that uncommon NULL case not only creates a silly run-time test, more importantly it causes that function to have a big stack frame for the dummy variable that isn't even used in the common case! So get rid of that stupid run-time behavior, and make the (few) functions that currently call with a NULL pointer just call a new helper function instead (naturally called inode_has_perm_noapd(), since it has no adp argument). This makes the run-time test be a static code generation issue instead, and allows for a much denser stack since none of the common callers need the dummy structure. And a denser stack not only means less stack space usage, it means better cache behavior. So we have a win-win-win from this simplification: less code executed, smaller stack footprint, and better cache behavior. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattrKees Cook2011-06-011-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit now requires that the profile passed is not NULL. Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to setprocattr. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | Merge branch 'docs-move' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-05-276-7/+7
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs * 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs: Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
| * | | Create Documentation/security/,Randy Dunlap2011-05-196-7/+7
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
* | | selinux: don't pass in NULL avd to avc_has_perm_noauditLinus Torvalds2011-05-262-11/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now security_get_user_sids() will pass in a NULL avd pointer to avc_has_perm_noaudit(), which then forces that function to have a dummy entry for that case and just generally test it. Don't do it. The normal callers all pass a real avd pointer, and this helper function is incredibly hot. So don't make avc_has_perm_noaudit() do conditional stuff that isn't needed for the common case. This also avoids some duplicated stack space. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | cgroups: add per-thread subsystem callbacksBen Blum2011-05-261-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add cgroup subsystem callbacks for per-thread attachment in atomic contexts Add can_attach_task(), pre_attach(), and attach_task() as new callbacks for cgroups's subsystem interface. Unlike can_attach and attach, these are for per-thread operations, to be called potentially many times when attaching an entire threadgroup. Also, the old "bool threadgroup" interface is removed, as replaced by this. All subsystems are modified for the new interface - of note is cpuset, which requires from/to nodemasks for attach to be globally scoped (though per-cpuset would work too) to persist from its pre_attach to attach_task and attach. This is a pre-patch for cgroup-procs-writable.patch. Signed-off-by: Ben Blum <bblum@andrew.cmu.edu> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | Set cred->user_ns in key_replace_session_keyringSerge E. Hallyn2011-05-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since this cred was not created with copy_creds(), it needs to get initialized. Otherwise use of syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); can lead to a NULL deref. Thanks to Robert for finding this. But introduced by commit 47a150edc2a ("Cache user_ns in struct cred"). Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.39) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into ↵James Morris2011-05-2411-208/+370
|\ \ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | for-linus Conflicts: lib/flex_array.c security/selinux/avc.c security/selinux/hooks.c security/selinux/ss/policydb.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c Manually resolve conflicts. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELINUX: add /sys/fs/selinux mount point to put selinuxfsGreg Kroah-Hartman2011-05-111-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the interest of keeping userspace from having to create new root filesystems all the time, let's follow the lead of the other in-kernel filesystems and provide a proper mount point for it in sysfs. For selinuxfs, this mount point should be in /sys/fs/selinux/ Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzerqung@0pointer.de> Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> [include kobject.h - Eric Paris] [use selinuxfs_obj throughout - Eric Paris] Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: introduce path_has_permEric Paris2011-04-281-14/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We currently have inode_has_perm and dentry_has_perm. dentry_has_perm just calls inode_has_perm with additional audit data. But dentry_has_perm can take either a dentry or a path. Split those to make the code obvious and to fix the previous problem where I thought dentry_has_perm always had a valid dentry and mnt. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | flex_array: flex_array_prealloc takes a number of elements, not an endEric Paris2011-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change flex_array_prealloc to take the number of elements for which space should be allocated instead of the last (inclusive) element. Users and documentation are updated accordingly. flex_arrays got introduced before they had users. When folks started using it, they ended up needing a different API than was coded up originally. This swaps over to the API that folks apparently need. Based-on-patch-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Tested-by: Chris Richards <gizmo@giz-works.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.38+]
| * | SELinux: pass last path component in may_createEric Paris2011-04-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | New inodes are created in a two stage process. We first will compute the label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the operation is allowed. We will then actually re-compute that same label and apply it in security_inode_init_security(). The change to do new label calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only passed the path component information all the way down the security_inode_init_security hook. Down the security_inode_create hook the path information did not make it past may_create. Thus the two calculations came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against the label that is created. Pass and use the same information in both places to harmonize the calculations and checks. Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtableEric Paris2011-04-283-61/+135
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To shorten the list we need to run if filename trans rules exist for the type of the given parent directory I put them in a hashtable. Given the policy we are expecting to use in Fedora this takes the worst case list run from about 5,000 entries to 17. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: generic hashtab entry counterEric Paris2011-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of a hashtab entry counter function only useful for range transition rules make a function generic for any hashtable to use. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: calculate and print hashtab stats with a generic functionEric Paris2011-04-281-19/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We have custom debug functions like rangetr_hash_eval and symtab_hash_eval which do the same thing. Just create a generic function that takes the name of the hash table as an argument instead of having custom functions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: skip filename trans rules if ttype does not match parent dirEric Paris2011-04-283-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now we walk to filename trans rule list for every inode that is created. First passes at policy using this facility creates around 5000 filename trans rules. Running a list of 5000 entries every time is a bad idea. This patch adds a new ebitmap to policy which has a bit set for each ttype that has at least 1 filename trans rule. Thus when an inode is created we can quickly determine if any rules exist for this parent directory type and can skip the list if we know there is definitely no relevant entry. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: rename filename_compute_type argument to *type instead of *conEric Paris2011-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | filename_compute_type() takes as arguments the numeric value of the type of the subject and target. It does not take a context. Thus the names are misleading. Fix the argument names. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: fix comment to state filename_compute_type takes an objname not a qstrEric Paris2011-04-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | filename_compute_type used to take a qstr, but it now takes just a name. Fix the comments to indicate it is an objname, not a qstr. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SMACK: smack_file_lock can use the struct pathEric Paris2011-04-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_file_lock has a struct path, so use that instead of only the dentry. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATHEric Paris2011-04-254-42/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODEEric Paris2011-04-255-68/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code complexity. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safeEric Paris2011-04-253-25/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not be RCU safe. This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue. Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen2011-04-254-7/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | SELinux: security_read_policy should take a size_t not ssize_tEric Paris2011-04-252-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The len should be an size_t but is a ssize_t. Easy enough fix to silence build warnings. We have no need for signed-ness. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2024-12-27 10:22:26 +0000