diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_cbc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_cbc.c | 178 |
1 files changed, 126 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c index e9b112c..3c2c165 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -53,8 +53,6 @@ * */ -#include <stdint.h> - #include "ssl_locl.h" #include <openssl/md5.h> @@ -118,7 +116,9 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead); /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1); - rec->length -= good & (padding_length+1); + padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); + rec->length -= padding_length; + rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); } @@ -150,6 +150,21 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, if (overhead > rec->length) return 0; + /* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning + * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the + * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in + * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the + * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is + * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least + * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe + * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */ + if (has_explicit_iv) + { + rec->data += block_size; + rec->input += block_size; + rec->length -= block_size; + } + padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1]; /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of @@ -172,6 +187,13 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, } } + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) + { + /* padding is already verified */ + rec->length -= padding_length; + return 1; + } + good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length); /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the @@ -205,23 +227,9 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1; good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); - rec->length -= good & (padding_length+1); - - /* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning - * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the - * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in - * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the - * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is - * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least - * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe - * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */ - if (has_explicit_iv) - { - rec->data += block_size; - rec->input += block_size; - rec->length -= block_size; - rec->orig_len -= block_size; - } + padding_length = good & (padding_length+1); + rec->length -= padding_length; + rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */ return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1)); } @@ -248,7 +256,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, */ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, - unsigned md_size) + unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len) { #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; @@ -267,7 +275,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, unsigned div_spoiler; unsigned rotate_offset; - OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size); + OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size); OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) @@ -275,8 +283,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, #endif /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ - if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) - scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); + if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) + scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. @@ -289,9 +297,9 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size; memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); - for (i = scan_start; i < rec->orig_len;) + for (i = scan_start; i < orig_len;) { - for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < rec->orig_len; i++, j++) + for (j = 0; j < md_size && i < orig_len; i++, j++) { unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start); unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end); @@ -341,7 +349,9 @@ static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) l2n(sha1->h3, md_out); l2n(sha1->h4, md_out); } +#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx; @@ -352,7 +362,11 @@ static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out); } } +#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX +#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx; @@ -363,19 +377,30 @@ static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out) l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out); } } +#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX +#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX +#endif /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { - switch (ctx->digest->type) +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if (FIPS_mode()) + return 0; +#endif + switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) { case NID_md5: case NID_sha1: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 case NID_sha224: case NID_sha256: +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 case NID_sha384: case NID_sha512: +#endif return 1; default: return 0; @@ -413,14 +438,15 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3) { - unsigned char md_state[sizeof(SHA512_CTX)]; + union { double align; + unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state; void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out); void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block); unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64; unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks, len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks, num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b; - uint64_t bits; + unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */ unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES]; /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */ unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -436,35 +462,38 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( * many possible overflows later in this function. */ OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024); - switch (ctx->digest->type) + switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) { case NID_md5: - MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state); + MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c); md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw; md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform; md_size = 16; sslv3_pad_length = 48; break; case NID_sha1: - SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state); + SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c); md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw; md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform; md_size = 20; break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 case NID_sha224: - SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state); + SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c); md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform; md_size = 224/8; break; case NID_sha256: - SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state); + SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c); md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform; md_size = 32; break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 case NID_sha384: - SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state); + SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c); md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform; md_size = 384/8; @@ -472,13 +501,14 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( md_length_size = 16; break; case NID_sha512: - SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state); + SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c); md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform; md_size = 64; md_block_size = 128; md_length_size = 16; break; +#endif default: /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been * called first to check that the hash function is @@ -577,17 +607,14 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36; - md_transform(md_state, hmac_pad); + md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad); } - j = 0; - if (md_length_size == 16) - { - memset(length_bytes, 0, 8); - j = 8; - } - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - length_bytes[i+j] = bits >> (8*(7-i)); + memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4); + length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24); + length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16); + length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8); + length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits; if (k > 0) { @@ -598,21 +625,21 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */ unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size; - md_transform(md_state, header); + md_transform(md_state.c, header); memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang); memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang); - md_transform(md_state, first_block); + md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++) - md_transform(md_state, data + md_block_size*i - overhang); + md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang); } else { /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */ memcpy(first_block, header, 13); memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13); - md_transform(md_state, first_block); + md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++) - md_transform(md_state, data + md_block_size*i - 13); + md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13); } } @@ -662,8 +689,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( block[j] = b; } - md_transform(md_state, block); - md_final_raw(md_state, block); + md_transform(md_state.c, block); + md_final_raw(md_state.c, block); /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b; @@ -694,3 +721,50 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record( *md_out_size = md_out_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + +/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but + * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases + * by digesting additional data. + */ + +void tls_fips_digest_extra( + const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len) + { + size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) + return; + block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx); + /* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA* + * digests and TLS to deal with. + * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9 + * otherwise. + * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks + * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest + * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise. + * So we have: + * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size + * equivalently: + * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1 + * HMAC adds a constant overhead. + * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes + * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128 + * for SHA384/SHA512 and + * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64 + * otherwise. + */ + digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29; + blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size; + blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size; + /* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original + * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a + * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to + * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum + * length TLS buffer. + */ + EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data, + (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size); + } +#endif |